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Abstract: To achieve bike sharing relocation 1  through travellers’ spontaneous 
behaviour, an innovative dynamic pricing strategy with negative prices is introduced in 
dockless bike sharing systems. In normal situation, users pay a positive price to 
operators for using a bike. However, when imbalanced distribution of bikes occurs in 
the system, users who cycle from the oversupplied area to undersupplied area will 
receive monetary reward from the operator, i.e., negative pricing applies. A user 
equilibrium dynamic traffic assignment model is developed to capture travellers’ mode-
path choice behaviour in response to the proposed dynamic pricing strategy. Travellers 
can use either a single travel mode (e.g. walk, bike and bus) or combined mode (e.g. 
bike+bus, walk+bus, walk+bike) to complete their trips. The user equilibrium travel 
pattern is formulated as a variational inequality problem and then solved by a path-flow 
swapping algorithm. Two numerical examples are conducted to demonstrate that the 
proposed dynamic pricing strategy with negative price is effective in terms of attracting 
users as well as achieving a more balanced bike repositioning, especially when the 
number of bikes provided in the system is limited. Compared to free price strategy, the 
proposed strategy has better performance from both profit and network performance 
aspects.  
Keywords: dynamic pricing strategy, negative price, dockless bike sharing, dynamic 
user equilibrium, bike relocation/repositioning 
1 Introduction 
Dockless bike sharing has recently become increasingly popular around the world. 
Users can unlock a public bike through scanning a smart phone application and park it 
at any allowed place after using it. As an emerging market, operators are trying to seize 
the market share by offering extremely low or even free price. For example, in 
Singapore, the two main operators, ofo and mobike, use a similar pricing strategy with 
zero deposit and low-price season ticket passes (S$1.5 for two months and S$5 for six 
months). This strategy quickly gains a large number of users and ensures market 
domination for both operators. Till March 2018, the number of public bikes has 
increased from the initial 1,000 to approximately 100,000 in Singapore within 1 year 
(Lim, 2018). 
Due to the one-way use characteristic, there is an issue of imbalanced distribution of 
bikes over time and space, especially during peak period. For example, most of the 
                                                             
1 The bike relocation mentioned in this paper is also referred as bike repositioning in the literature. 
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users cycle from residential area to the nearest transit stations in the first-mile trip stage 
in the morning. Subsequently, bikes in residential area are quickly out of stock and the 
latter arrival users could not have the access to bikes. In this case, the level of user 
satisfaction may drop significantly as they cannot receive the service on time. Operators 
usually utilise dedicated relocation vehicles (e.g., light trucks) to move the bikes from 
oversupply area to undersupply area. Due to the reasons of limited resources (e.g. 
manpower, budget, vehicle capacity) and high relocation cost ($3 per bike (DeMaio, 
2009)), this approach could not fundamentally solve the imbalance problem in dockless 
bike sharing system. 
In this study, we propose a dynamic pricing strategy to guide the users’ cycling 
behaviour so as to achieve the objective of a more balanced relocation of bikes in the 
system. Normally, users need to pay a positive price to the operator for the service. 
However, if the users park the bikes at an undersupplied area, wherein the ratio of the 
available bikes to the real-time demand is below certain threshold value, a radical 
negative price is adopted, i.e., the operator will even offer the users monetary incentives. 
With such a negative pricing scheme, existing bike users might adjust their routing 
choices while new users might be attracted from their original travel modes to use bike. 
Both decisions will contribute to the objective of a more balanced bike relocation. To 
test the performance of the proposed pricing strategy, a dynamic traffic assignment 
model is developed with user equilibrium principle to reflect the users’ behaviour 
choice and estimate network flow distribution. The flow assignment results could be 
used for assessing the effect of the proposed pricing strategy from both profit and 
network performance aspects. This study has the following novel significant 
contributions: 
(1) We introduce a dynamic pricing scheme with negative prices into bike sharing 
system. Indeed, to our best knowledge, this would be the first attempt to 
theoretically investigate the application of negative pricing scheme in an urban 
transportation problem. 
(2) This is one of the first few studies to deal with the bike relocation problem using 
user-based approach in dockless bike sharing system while most of the existing 
solutions to bike relocation problems applied operator-based approach. 
(3) A dynamic traffic assignment model and its solution algorithm are developed to 
capture travellers’ mode-path choice behaviour in response to the proposed 
dynamic pricing strategy. 
(4) A systematic comparison among the traditional positive price strategy, free 
price strategy and the proposed strategy with negative prices is analysed.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
the problem of bike sharing relocation and pricing strategy; Section 3 lays the modelling 
foundation as well as the definition of negative price strategy. Path travel disutility is 
formulated in Section 4, followed by the detailed DTA model and solution algorithm 
in Section 5. Section 6 gives two numerical examples to illustrate the performance of 
the model and the effect of the negative price strategy. Discussions and conclusions are 
summarised at last in Section 7. 
2 Literature review 
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There are two types of approaches to solve the bike relocation problem: user-based 
approach and operator-based approach. The user-based approach is to guide the users 
to leave their bikes at specific areas to balance the bike distribution in the system. The 
operator-based approach is to relocate the bikes by operators using relocation vehicles 
(e.g. small truck). The operator-based approach is commonly used in practice, which is 
indeed a vehicle routing problem or pickup and delivery problem. Various models and 
algorithms have been developed to describe and solve the operator-based problem 
(Raviv et al., 2013; Chemla et al., 2013a; Dell'Amico et al., 2014; Forma et al., 2015; 
Erdoğan et al., 2015; Schuijbroek et al.,2017; Shui and Szeto, 2018; Szeto and Shui, 
2018; Ho and Szeto, 2014; Ho and Szeto, 2017, Kadri et al., 2016, Szeto et al., 2016).  
Most of the existing studies dealt with the station-based bike sharing system. 
Nevertheless, very few researches worked on the relocation problem for the recently 
emerging dockless bike sharing system; meanwhile, they all applied the operator-based 
relocation approach. For example, Reiss and Bogenberger (2015 and 2016) used Global 
Positioning System (GPS) data to obtain an optimal bike distribution model and an 
operator-based relocation strategy was given. Pal and Zhang (2017) presented a Novel 
Mixed Integer Linear Program for tackling static rebalancing with single and multiple 
vehicles. Caggiani et al. (2018) developed a comprehensive dynamic bike relocation 
framework including a prediction and relocation Decision Support System.  
In the literature, very few studies have been carried out to solve the bike relocation 
problem using user-based approaches, in either station-based bike sharing system or 
dockless bike sharing system. The Paris Vélib’ system provides static incentives to 
users who return their bicycles to given stations (Laporte et al., 2015). Chemla et al. 
(2013b) and Pfrommer et al. (2014) proposed dynamic pricing strategies to encourage 
users to return bikes to empty nodes. Singla et al. (2015) extended the model of 
Pfrommer et al. (2014) by incorporating a crowdsourcing mechanism by providing 
users with alternative choices to pick or return bikes in exchange for monetary 
incentives. Dötterl et al. (2017) developed an event-driven agent architecture to predict 
the future demand with situation-aware incentives. Reiss and Bogenberger (2017) 
found that the user-based approach could save cost for the operator and maintain a 
balanced bike distribution in the system. However, existing studies have shown that the 
effect of user-based relocation approach is not as significant as the operator-based 
relocation approach in real operation (Pfrommer et al., 2014; Reiss and Bogenberger, 
2017). The reason is that traditional user-based approach applies low cost pricing 
strategy, which may not be sufficient to induce the travellers to alter their travel 
behaviour. Therefore, this study introduces a new concept of negative price to achieve 
the objective of a more balanced bike relocation.  
Generally, travellers need to pay a positive price for using a bike. Traveller is willing 
to pay as long as the positive utility from the received service could offset the disutility 
of making the payment. From the operators’ point of view, the price floor is determined 
by the marginal cost, that is, the price can at least make a positive contribution. 
Normally, the marginal cost for a mature transport service (e.g. bus, metro) is greater 
than zero, i.e., the price of using this service is positive. The phrase of “negative price” 
was first introduced in the studies of good storage (Working, 1949; Wright and 
Williams, 1989). The price of certain good will decrease after it has been stored for 
some time. People still choose to store them although they might suffer loss. 
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Researchers concluded that the storage leads to a negative price.  Different from its 
initial definition of price drop after storage, negative price now has been defined as the 
phenomenon that customers acquire a good or service with even extra payment from 
sellers. Unlike below-cost price or free price, customers do not need to pay anything; 
instead, they receive the good or service as well as payment from seller. Some early 
studies also pointed out that the price of the good or service could be zero or negative 
from theoretical point of view (Dantzig et al., 1979; Brihaye et al., 2014). In application, 
the negative price strategy was firstly and mainly applied in energy field. In Germany, 
parts of the electricity production stemmed from wind power. As wind is an intermitting 
energy source, the generated power reacts strongly to the stochastic wind power infeed 
(Nicolosi, 2010). As the power could not be stored, when the demand is lower, the 
power supplier suffered from huge cost to quickly adjust the status of equipment to 
reduce the power generation. Until 2008, power supplier started to pay negative price 
to customers who consume the power when the power generation exceeds the demand. 
It has been verified that negative price strategy is a valid method to reduce power 
supplier’s loss (Brandstätt et al., 2011; Simon, 2016). Another application of negative 
price is in internet field. Microsoft launched a Bing Cashback programme in 2008 that 
allowed advertisers to bid for search advertisements by offering a percentage of sales 
back to users (Fried, 2010). However, this programme was terminated in 2010 as the 
contributions from users do not achieve the desired range of vision. In this study, we 
investigate the feasibility of negative price concept in dockless bike sharing system. 
Facing unbalanced distribution in the system, operators offer rewards to the users who 
cycle from oversupplied area to undersupplied area. This strategy could achieve bike 
relocation as well as operation cost reduction, and thus bring a positive contribution.   
When the negative pricing strategy is introduced in the dockless bike sharing system, it 
will significantly affect customers’ travel choice behaviour. Dynamic traffic 
assignment (DTA) model is one of the key methods to support the evaluation of 
different pricing strategies in a network context. DTA was first proposed by Merchant 
and Nemhauser (1976) in considering time varying flows. Various DTA methods (e.g. 
analytical models, simulation models, and cell models) have been developed and 
applied in transportation analysis (Lo and Szeto, 2004; Szeto and Lo, 2006; Wang and 
Du, 2016; Liu and Geroliminis, 2017; Liu and Szeto, 2019; Zhang and Liu 2019). One 
major application of DTA is the evaluation of dynamic road pricing strategies (Lu et 
al., 2008; Zheng et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013). Some researchers have tested the 
effect of different pricing strategies in taxi market (Ciari et al., 2015; Qian et al., 2017; 
Long et al., 2017). Recently, Li et al. (2018) examined the different pricing strategies 
in free-floating car-sharing scheme and found that rental price has significant 
implications for travel demand management. Xu et al., (2018) also pointed out the 
demand for car-sharing service is elastic with respect to the trip price. These studies all 
followed the traditional pricing strategy with positive price at any time. The application 
of DTA model in bike sharing system is mainly in the area of fleet allocation. Usually, 
a time-space network is constructed to describe the dynamic bike-sharing demand 
(Ghoshe t al, 2017; Lu, 2016; Regue and Recker, 2014; Shui and Szeto, 2018; Yan et 
al, 2017; Caggiani et al., 2018), while the fleet allocation is formulated as mixed integer 
programme. The usage of DTA model to discuss the influence of pricing strategy has 
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not been fully discussed in the literature. This study would find out whether the 
proposed pricing strategy is feasible and effective in dockless bike sharing system. 
3 Basic considerations 
3.1 Assumptions 
Some assumptions are made prior to the modelling as follows: 
A1. The study time horizon [0, T] is discretised into a finite set of equal duration time 
intervals, i.e.,  . Let Δ be the duration of each time interval . 
A2. The study focuses on first/last mile trip, where three common travel modes are 
considered including walk, bike and bus. Travellers all have the access to dockless 
public bikes and do not own their private bikes.  
A3. Travellers may use one or up to three modes in a trip. In other words, maximum 
two transfers are allowed.  
A4. The heterogeneity of traveller is considered in terms of a discrete set of value of 
time (VOT). 
A5. Bus runs on dedicated bus lanes so that bus travel time is fixed according to the 
timetable and is not affected by other modes.  
A6. Bidirectional flow on walk and bike links are considered in a separate way. There 
is no mixed-traffic flow on all links.  
A7. All travellers will check the bike availability and price before making a mode-path 
choice. They can reserve any available bike regardless the distance. The reservation 
follows first-reserve-first-use principle.  
A8. There are limited number of bikes provided in the network. If there are no bikes 
available, travellers at this location could only choose to walk or take bus.  
A9. All travellers who take the negative price reward will follow the rules to return the 
bikes on time. 
3.2 Notation 
Primary notation used in this study are defined in Table 1 as follows: 
Table 1 Notations 
Sets 
N Set of nodes 
T Set of total time 
  Set of Origin-Destination (OD) pairs 
  Set of paths 
 Set of links 
  Set of links going out of node ,   
  Set of incoming links of node ,  
 Set of travel mode,   
Indices 




( )A i i ( ) ( ){ },A i i j= ÎA
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  OD pair,  
  Path   
  Travel link,   
  Nodes 
 Origin and destination nodes of w 
,  Origin and destination nodes of bike stage  
  Travel mode,   
  Time intervals 
  Passenger groups according to value of time 
Parameters 
  Value of time for group k 
  Comfort loss-time conversion coefficient 
  Comfort loss of mode m per time 
  Large value, to impose extremely high cost for the case with no 
available bikes 
  Normal positive price of renting bike  
 Supply of bikes 
  Tolerance level 
Variables 
  Disutility of w via p for group k at time  
  Disutility of group k on link l at time t 
  Indicator variable: traveller of w depart at  via p and entry link l at , 
equal to 1; otherwise 0  
 Time cost of mode m for group k on link l at time t 
 Monetary cost of mode m for group k on link l at time t 
 Comfort cost of mode m for group k on link l at time t 
 Free flow time of mode m on link l 
 Flow of mode m on link l at time t 
  threshold value of bike supply at node i at time t below which 
undersupply is defined 
  threshold value of bike supply at node i at time t above which 
oversupply is defined 
 value of bike supply at node i at time t  
  Flow for group k of w via p at time t 
  Minimum disutility for group k of w via p at time t 
  Inflow of w via p on link l at time t 
  Outflow of w via p on link l at time t 
  Flow of w departing at time t 
  Flow of w arriving at time t 
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  Cumulative flow of mode m for group k of w via p by time t 
  Travel time of mode m on link l depart at time t 
 
3.3 Multimodal Supernetwork 
Supernetwork is abstracted from a normal network, wherein the hierarchy of real 
network and the virtual connection among the network are both included. In this study, 
a multimodal transportation supernetwork is constructed. Firstly, the study area is 
divided into certain number of traffic analysis zones (TAZs), where each TAZ is 
connected with real road links. As users can park the bikes at any location in the 
dockless bike sharing system, the size of one TAZ is usually selected to encapsulate 
one or several buildings within the field of human vision. Secondly, supplementary 
virtual links are added to the real transportation network to support the full description 
of travel behaviour, such as access link, transfer link as well as the weight on each link. 
Accordingly, an illustrative transportation network as in Figure 1 could be expanded 
and represented by a supernetwork as shown in Figure 2, wherein the solid lines 
represent the running links and the virtual links represent the access and transfer links. 
The weight on each link could be various attributes, such as travel time, monetary cost, 
comfort loss.  
 
Figure 1 Study Area 
 
Figure 2 Supernetwork 




A path in supernetwork is called superpath. Not all superpaths can describe actual travel 
routes. For example, travellers will not have unlimited transfers in one trip. Based on 
the assumptions in this study, a superpath is defined to be feasible only if it has 
maximum two transfers and no two continuous transfer links between one OD pair is 
allowed. For example, in Figure 2, path 1-4-24-17-18-19 is a feasible superpath 
between OD pair (1,10) while path 1-4-26-29-17-18-19 is not a feasible superpath 
between OD pair (1,10) as there are two continuous transfer links 26 and 29.  
3.4 Negative price scheme 
As mentioned above, negative price strategy in this study means that user could get 
monetary reward from operator.  The negative price scheme is only applicable when 
users cycle from oversupply area to undersupply area so that the bike relocation is 
achieved in the system. Three statuses are defined for each TAZ in the study area, i.e., 
undersupply, normal and oversupply: 
(1) 
Therefore, the dynamic pricing scheme in this study is proposed as: user will pay a 
positive price if the status of the origin TAZ or destination TAZ is normal; Negative 
price applies when the status of the origin TAZ is oversupply and the destination TAZ 
is undersupply. To illustrate the performance of the proposed strategy, two common 
pricing strategies are also considered as the comparison benchmarks: traditional fixed 
pricing strategy where the price is a constant positive value, and free pricing strategy. 
For simplification purpose, we abbreviate the proposed negative price strategy as NP, 
traditional positive price strategy as PP, and free price strategy as FP in the rest of the 
paper.  
The negative price value is assumed to be dependent on the level of undersupply or 
scarcity degree of bikes at the destination nodes. Hereby, we propose a simple linear 
relationship between the negative price and the level of undersupply of bikes. The 
structure of the pricing scheme can be schematically depicted in Figure 3. Basically, if 
the bike trip starts from an oversupplied location to an undersupplied one, the negative 
price will apply; otherwise, the normal positive price will be adopted. Bounded by a 
maximum value, the negative price is set to be linear with respect to the level of 
undersupply.  
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Figure 3 Negative price scheme 
Based on the above analysis, the dynamic pricing scheme with negative price can be 
proposed as follows: 
  (2) 
Here, when users cycle bikes from an oversupplied area to an undersupplied area, a 
negative price applies, wherein the value of negative price is set to be determined by 
the level of undersupply at the destination TAZ (i.e., ) and the 
predefined maximum negative price . That is, to determine the negative price, 
it is required to know the supply of bikes , as well as the defined threshold 
value of undersupply . It is noted that, the real-time information of bike supply 
can be easily obtained in practice from the GPS data. On the other hand, the key is to 
determine how to set the threshold value for undersupply. It is not difficult to 
understand that the threshold value for undersupply is highly related to the bike travel 
demand. In practice, the bike demands at different locations could be estimated by 
adopting prediction methods, such as the Auto Regressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model, based on the historical and real-time data. In the 
proposed negative pricing scheme in this study, we set the threshold value for 
undersupply by assuming a simple linear relationship with the predicted demand value 
of , i.e., . Herein, the parameter  could be determined based 
on the specific objectives, e.g., attracting more users or maximising fare revenue. In 
practice, other than applying rigorous optimisation modeling approach, one can obtain 
the optimal value of the parameter  by conducting a simple sensitivity analysis 
approach.  
Proposition 1 With a sufficient number of bikes in market, NP will reduce to PP. 
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Proof.  From Eq. (2), it is known that negative price occurs when the relationship 
between bike supply and the threshold values at the origin and destination area satisfies
, . The threshold values  and  are 
highly relevant to dynamic bike travel demand at certain location. As the bike supply 
level in the market goes up,  will increase and therefore the probability of 
fulfilling negative price condition  will reduce. If the bike supply in 
the market is sufficiently large, the negative price conditions would not be satisfied, i.e., 
the proposed NP scheme defined in (2) will reduce to PP.  
Essentially, two types of behaviour changes might happen if NP is adopted: One is the 
change of travel mode, that is, the non-cycling travel mode users would use bikes and 
end the trips at the undersupply TAZ. The other one is the change of travel path, that is, 
the existing bike users would use another path and end the trip at the undersupply TAZ. 
For example, in Figure 4, node 1 is the origin node and node 3 is the destination node. 
For the travellers who usually take bus from node 1 to node 3, after NP is adopted, they 
might choose to cycle from node 1 to node 2 and then take bus from node 2 to node 3, 
as the reward from negative price scheme might offset the incurred extra travel disutility. 
Similarly, for an existing bike user from node 1 to node 3, he/she might park the bike 
at node 2 and then walk or take bus from node 2 to node 3, if reward from negative 
price could offset the added disutility. Both of these travel behaviour changes 
mentioned above can contribute to the bike relocation. In this case, operators are able 
to reduce the operation cost for bike relocation. The achieved real-time relocation 
through travellers’ spontaneous travel behaviour could also improve the level of service, 
and thus bring new users and increase revenue.  
 
Figure 4 A super path with three nodes 
Proposition 2 Under NP, for the first type of behaviour change, i.e., switching from 
non-cycling mode to cycling mode, one bike will at least serve two users. If the 
maximum NP value is set to be not greater than PP fare, non-negative fare revenue 
could be obtained.  
Proof. Under NP, if a traveller changes travel mode, he/she will relocate a bike from 
an oversupplied area to an undersupplied area where demand is larger than supply. Then, 
another user will be able to ride this bike to other places. In this case, this bike will be 
used by at least two travellers. If the traveller selects his/her original non-cycling travel 
mode, the bike sharing service operator achieve zero fare revenue. If mode switching 
occurs, from Eq. (2), the fare revenue for the first trip is subject to NP scheme 
( ), while the second trip follows PP ( ). In 
this case, the total direct fare revenue can be rewritten as 
. If , the fare revenue must 
be positive. 
( ) ( ),2bike biker rbike tht tF >F ( ) ( ),1bike bikes sbike tht tF £F ( ),2bikerth tF ( ),1bikesth tF
( )bikesbike tF
( ) ( ),1bike bikes sbike tht tF £F
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1 .1bike bike bikes s snegbike th bike thg t t t té ù× F -F Fë û
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Proposition 3 Under NP, for the second type of behaviour change, i.e., the travel path 
adjustment, more users would be served and positive fare revenue will be obtained with 
nevertheless smaller amount of fare revenue.  
Proof. Under NP, if a traveller decides to change path, he/she must switch from a path 
with positive price to a path with negative price. The original fare revenue is . The 
new trip after changing would apply negative pricing, which means that the new 
destination is undersupplied. In this case, the bike will be used by another user with 
positive price, and more users would be served as compared with PP. The new fare 
revenue is . As , we have 
. If it is assumed , 
fare revenue would be positive, but it is still less than original fare revenue. 
A set of illustrative examples with three scenarios is given to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of NP as compared to traditional PP scheme and FP scheme. Assume the 
original travel modes in three scenarios are all under PP, where traveller travels from 
node 1 to node 3 passing node 2 as shown in Figure 3. Node 1 is in the status of 
oversupply, while node 2 undersupply and node 3 normal. Two links share the same 
distance in three scenarios. Three strategies are given for three scenarios: FP(1-2-3) 
represent the scenario that the whole network is under FP, i.e., with free charge; FP (1-
2) is that link connecting node 1 and node 2 is under FP while the other link is under 
PP; NP (1-2) is that link connecting node 1 and node 2 is under NP while the rest link 
is still under PP. The highly possible travel decisions under different pricing strategies 
are listed in Table 2. From Table 2, it could be concluded that FP (1-2-3) cannot achieve 
bike relocation while FP (1-2) and NP (1-2) are able to do so. The behaviour adjustment 
in Scenario A belongs to the second type change, i.e., path changing, while Scenarios 
B and C apply mode switching. In Scenario B, the original travel mode is walking from 
node 1 to node 3. When FP is offered from node 1 to node 2, travellers are not likely to 
choose to use bike as they need to take extra effort (disutility) to cycle. However, if 
extra reward is given, travellers may choose cycling from node 1 to node 2 as the reward 
might offset their added disutility from using bike. Therefore, NP (1-2) is more effective 
than FP (1-2-3) and FP (1-2) in terms of attracting travellers to cycle and thus achieving 
a more balanced relocation. In reality, NP and FP could directly attract large number of 
users in a short time and indirectly reduce the advertisement cost. With the huge number 
of users, ancillary revenue other than fare revenue could be generated. Unlike below-
cost price, free price and negative price have highly likelihood to let users overvalue 
the service because humans naturally fear of loss. Free price and negative price will not 
lead to any loss while below cost price still have a risk of loss.  
Table 2 Highly possible travel behaviour under different pricing strategies  
Scenario PP(original) FP (1-2-3) FP (1-2) NP (1-2) 
A bike:1-2-3 bike: 1-2-3 
bike:1-2-3  
or bike:1-2 bus 2-3 
bike:1-2-3  
or bike:1-2 bus 2-3 
pos
bikeg
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4 Path travel disutility   
Based on the assumption that the travel disutility on each link is independent, the 
generalised path travel disutility could be calculated by summing up the corresponding 
link disutility on this path as follows: 
  (3) 
For each link, the link travel disutility includes three components, travel time, monetary 
cost and comfort loss (discomfort). Travel time consists of walking time, cycling time, 
in-vehicle time and waiting time. Considering the weight of each component, the link 
travel disutility could be expressed as: 
  (4) 
where ,  and  are weight parameters,  . 
In a multimodal network with consideration of the combined travel mode, there are 
three types of travel links, i.e., running links, transfer links and access links. Running 
links include walk links, bike links and bus links. For simplification purpose, the 
monetary cost on bike and bus links is moved to the connected access link.  
4.1 Walk link disutility 
Pedestrian walks on the walk link without being affected by other modes. The 
interaction of bi-direction pedestrian flow on walk link is considered. Travel time for 
walking is calculated as in Wu and Lam (2003). There is no monetary cost on walk link. 
Comfort loss (discomfort) on walk link is directly related to the travel time. Thus, three 
components in walk link disutility are calculated by: 
  (5) 
where  and  represent the two directions on link l.  , ,  and  are 
parameters to be calibrated with observed data. 
  (6) 
  (7) 
4.2 Bike link disutility 
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Similarly, cyclists do not share the bike link with pedestrians or bus passengers. The 
interaction of bi-direction cyclist flow on bike link is also considered in the travel time 
calculation. The monetary cost is assumed to be dependent on the supply and demand 
interaction at the departure time, and not relevant with the travel time. Thus, the 
monetary cost on bike link can be transferred to the connected access link. As cycling 
is a human-powered travel mode, comfort loss on bike link is closely related to the 
travel time. Then, the three components in bike link disutility are given by: 
  (8) 
  (9) 
  (10) 
4.3 Bus link disutility 
Bus service is assumed to follow strictly the running time on timetable, which is not 
affected by other modes. Assuming that a flat fare ticket structure applies, one can move 
the monetary cost on bus link to the connected access link. Besides the travel time, 
passengers may feel discomfort on the bus due to the crowded environment in peak 
period. Then, the three components in bus link disutility could be obtained as follows: 
  (11) 
  (12) 
  (13) 
where  is bus capacity and  is capacity of link l. 
4.4 Transfer link disutility 
Travel time on transfer link includes transfer walking time and transfer waiting time. 
Transfer walking time is approximately equal to the ratio of transfer walking distance 
to the average walking speed. Transfer waiting time is incurred only for transfer from 
walk or bike link to bus link, which is equal to half of bus headway. There is no 
monetary cost on transfer link. Comfort loss on transfer link is decided by the transfer 
walking time. The three components in transfer link disutility are expressed as follows: 
  (14) 
  (15) 
  (16) 
4.5 Access link disutility 
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Travel time on access link is zero if the access link is connected to walk or bike link, 
and equal to half of the bus headway if the access link is connected to bus link. 
Monetary cost on access link could be bike rental fee or bus fare cost. There is no 
comfort loss on access link. The three components in access link disutility are expressed 
as follows: 
  (17) 
  (18) 
  (19) 
where , . 
Bike rental fee follows the dynamic pricing scheme, which can be expressed as follows: 
  (20) 
Here, when bike supply is zero, a prohibitively large value of cost for using bikes is 
imposed. is a constant coefficient to represent contrast preference from negative price. 
According to the theory of loss aversion, when people face the same amount of gains 
and losses, losses are more intolerant than gains. The disutility that comes from losses 
is 2.25 times of the utility from gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  
5 Model and algorithm 
5.1 Dynamic user equilibrium principle  
According to assumption A4, we consider k classes of travellers with different values 
of time. The dynamic user equilibrium condition is defined as: for each class k and each 
OD pair at each time interval, the total travel disutility for all superpaths that are being 
used equal to the minimal total super path travel disutility. It could be formulated as: 
  (21) 
  (22) 
  (23) 
5.2 Dynamic network constraints 
Five types of constraints are given according to the model requirements. First, the basic 
definitional constraints are expressed as: 
  (24) 
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  (25) 
  (26) 
  (27) 
Second, at the origin and destination nodes, flow conservation constraints satisfy:  
  (28) 
  (29) 
where  denote the m mode flow of class k departing at origin node to destination 
node at time t, and  denote the m mode flow of class k arriving at destination 
from origin at time t. For all the other nodes，flow conservation constraints can be 
written as: 
  (30) 
Third, flow propagation constraints entail: 
 (31) 
  (32) 
Fourth, nonnegativity constraints are: 
  (33) 
  (34) 
  (35) 
  (36) 
  (37) 
Last, boundary and bike constraints include: 
  (38) 
  (39) 
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  (40) 
  (41) 
  (42) 
5.3 Variational inequality model  
The dynamic traffic flow pattern satisfying network constraint set (24)-(42) is indeed a 
multi-class generalised travel-disutility-based dynamic user equilibrium superpath 
choice state as described in the variational inequality problem (43). 
  (43) 
where the feasible region is Ω={(24)-(42)}. 
Theorem 1 There is at least one solution to variational inequality (43). 
Proof. A standard theorem in the theory of variational inequalities indicates that: if the 
feasible region Ω is compact and the mapping function of the problem are continuous, 
there exists at least one solution to VI formulation (43).  
First, as the feasible region Ω={(24)-(42)} of VI formulation (43) consists of a set of 
linear constraints, thus the region is compact. Second, due to the imbalanced 
distribution of bikes at each TAZ, the travel disutility value during calculation is 
unsmooth, but the travel disutility function is still continuous. If the interval length is 
infinitely close to zero (i.e., continuous-time), the link inflows will be continuous with 
path inflows vector. Then the existence of the dynamic user equilibrium solution can 
be guaranteed in principle. 
Due to the inclusion of 0-1 integer variables , the disutility calculated by Eq. 
(3) are non-linear and non-convex. In addition, strict monotonicity of the path disutility 
is not ensured as it is highly dependent on the structure of supernetwork. Therefore, the 
solution uniqueness of VI formulation (43) cannot be guaranteed.  
In real situation, the time interval length is hardly to be infinitely close to zero. The 
violation of the solution existence requirement might lead to the non-existence of 
solution. Moreover, the unbalanced distribution of demand and supply will lead to the 
unsmooth property of travel disutility function. As of the discrete time assumption, the 
disutility value may also not be small enough to ensure the existence of the proposed 
dynamic user equilibrium. Thus, we adopt the tolerance-based dynamic user 
equilibrium principle proposed by Szeto (2003), and therefore formulations (21)-(23) 
and (43) could be converted as: 
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where the feasible region is Ω={(24)-(42)}. When , (45) is equivalent to (43). 
When , it is reasonable in real situation, where the travel disutility of all used 
paths between the OD pair are within an acceptable tolerance from the minimum OD 
path disutility. 
Inference 1 There is at least one solution to variational inequality (45). 
Proof. Szeto (2003) has proved that the tolerance-based principle is a generalisation of 
the traditional dynamic user equilibrium principle. That is, if , (45) will be reduced 
to (43). It is a relaxation of (43), so the solution exists. 
5.4 Solution algorithm 
A path-flow swapping algorithm is developed to solve the proposed model. The 
solution algorithm starts with initialised flows on the feasible path and available bikes 
in each TAZ. The detailed steps are described as follows: 
Step 0: Set up the parameters and load the multi-state super networks for all modes, t=1. 
Step 1: Identify the feasible path sets using enumeration method, in which the paths 
longer than 3 times of the shortest path or with superfluous transfer times are excluded. 
Step 2: Load the demand at time t on the network. 
Step 3: Assign the demand stochastically on feasible paths, in which the constraints 
(28)-(29), (33)-(37), and (38)-(42) are satisfied.  
Step 4: Calculate the real time traffic volume on each link at time t and bike supplies at 
each node based on the constraints (24)-(27) and (30)-(32).   
Step 5: Calculate the travel time, monetary cost and comfort loss on each link based on 
Eqs. (5)-(20). 
Step 6: Calculate the travel disutility on each link based on Eq. (4). 
Step 7: Calculate the travel disutility on each feasible path based on Eq. (3). 
Step 8: Convergence test. If the following convergence condition 
 is satisfied, the algorithm stops, record the traffic 
volume on the network at time t’, update the number of bikes in each TAZ, update t, 
t=t+1, and return to Step 2; otherwise, continue. Herein,   and  denote the 
vectors of traffic flow indicator and path disutility at iteration a respectively, is 
the minimum path disutility at iteration a.  
Step 9: Update current traffic flows, using:  
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where , and  .  and 
are given as flow adjustment parameters;  is the path flow vector at iteration a. 
Considering the constraints (40)-(42), update the number of bike at each TAZ, a=a+1, 
return to Step 4. 
During the path-flow adjustment process, the manipulated conditions,  , 
and  (Nagurney and Zhang, 1997; 
Huang and Lam, 2002) hold and direct the process to an convergence state within 
tolerance limit. 
5.5 Profit analysis  
One intrinsic question arises is whether the operator can still gain profits or not after 
introducing the proposed pricing strategy. We consider a general profit definition, 
which includes not only the fare revenue, but also the user value. User value is 
important when a new service enters the market. Operators might be willing to lose 
money at the initial stage of service operation if they can attract more users and 
dominate the market. After the initial promotion stage, the operator can adjust the 
operational goal to pursue fare revenue maximisation. Therefore, a set of 
comprehensive profit optimisation model is developed for both initial promotion stage 
and the normal operation stage. At the initial promotion stage, the main decision 
variable is the total bikes investment, i.e., what is optimal bike supply to the market, 
while the main operational goal is to attract maximum number of users with limited 
resources. Therefore, the maximisation profit objective function could be expressed as: 
  (46) 
where  is the overall profit, and is the optimal number of bikes, 
.  is the number of registered users who have paid the deposit. 
The first item on the right-hand side describes the total user value in the market, where 
 is the unit user value. The second item represents the total deposit revenue, where 
 is the deposit per user. The third item depicts the total bike cost, where  is the cost 
per bike. The constraints of model objective function (46) are (3)-(42). 
After the initial promotion stage, there will be a huge number of stable existing users 
in the market. Few potential new users will be attracted, even though the price 
promotion continues. Operators could adjust the operational goal to achieve fare 
revenue maximisation. At this normal operation stage, the bike investment and new 
deposit income are nearly zero due to the few new users. In this case, the operators seek 
to find out the optimal pricing scheme and bike supplies so as to maximise the total 
profit, wherein the objective function could be expressed as:  
  (47) 
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The first item on the right side is the profit from user deposit, where is the interest 
from one user deposit.  is the number of registered users who have paid the deposit. 
The second item is the fare revenue, where  and 
  is the dynamic traffic equilibrium solution of (42) that is related to  
and  . The third item covers the bike depreciation expense and operation cost, 
which is assumed to be positively related to the number of bikes, .  
The constraints of objective function (47) are (3)-(42).  
The primary objective of the above analysis is to present model formulation for the 
dockless bike sharing service providers to find the optimal operation strategy if the 
proposed negative pricing scheme is applied. Two formulated models are introduced 
for different stages of service operation as the service providers’ objective changes as 
time advances. One can notice that, the forumated models are indeed in the format of 
bi-level programming formulation, which is very hard to be solved to its global optimal 
solutions. In this study, while we propose this model formulation on finding optimal 
operation strategy in presence of negative pricing scheme, the development of the 
efficient solution algorithms to obtain quality solutions is left to be addressed in the 
future studies. In practice, when high solution quality is not required, one can be 
recommended to apply sensitivity analysis approach to obtain a good solution result. 
6 Numerical examples 
Two numerical examples are presented to illustrate the effect of the proposed negative 
pricing strategy on bike relocation, travel behaviour and network performance.  
6.1 Numerical results for test example 1 
The first example is designed to show the effect of the proposed pricing strategy onto 
achieving a more balanced bike relocation. For illustration purpose, we conduct the 
numerical example in a simple network with three nodes and links as shown in Figure 
5. The number on each link represents the travel distance. Traffic flow over time is 
uniformly distributed in the network as shown in Table 3, where the node in business 
area only has inflow demand, the node in residential area only has outflow demand, and 
the rest node at metro station has both inflow and outflow demand. Average speed, bus 
ticket price, headway information and a series of discomfort conversion parameters for 
different modes are set to be the same as in Meng et al. (2014). VOT parameters are 
adopted from Zhang et al. (2017). Bi-directional flow travel time equation is adopted 
from Wu and Lam (2003). Other parameters are set as follows: k=1, VOT=10, , 
， ， ， ， ,  and 
. Traffic departures from 0 to 60 min. 
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Figure 5 Example 1 network 
Table 3 OD demand of example 1 
O                         D Business Area Residential Area Metro Station 
Business Area 0 0 0 
Residential Area 1 traveller /min 0 2 travellers /min 
Metro Station 1 traveller /min 0 0 
 
Figure 6 shows the number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation at metro station 
over time. Three different pricing strategies, i.e., negative pricing, free pricing and 
normal positive pricing, are tested and compared in this example. One can observe that 
the number of bike trips under three pricing strategies are identical, as well as the bike 
trip accumulation. It is because the travel disutility of bike is the lowest as compared to 
other alternative modes. In this study, while the travel disutility is determined by many 
factors including travel time, monetary cost, and comfort loss, comfort loss, the 
differential monetary cost under the three pricing strategies would not change the fact 
that cycling is the most favourite travel mode in this tested example. However, the 
dynamic and spatial bike departures and arrivals, as well as the bike supply in the 
network, are significantly different under different pricing strategies, as will be 




Figure 6 The number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation departure from metro 
station over time 
 
(a) Negative Price    (b) Free Price 
 
(c) Positive Price 
Figure 7 The detailed supply, demand and actual trip numbers at metro station over 
time 
The detailed supply, demand and actual bike trip numbers are given in Figure 7. One 
can observe that the supply is always above the real demand. However, the supply lines 
under three different pricing strategies are different. The number of available bikes 
continuously decreases at the beginning stage. As the time advances, the number of 
inflow bike arrivals would exceed the outflow bike departures and the number of bikes 
starts to increase. The arrival rates at the metro station under different pricing strategies 
are displayed in Figure 8. As the initial number of bikes in residential area is limited, 
the bikes that flow from residential area to metro station would reduce to zero and the 
number of bikes at metro station would decrease. It should be noted that, the time points 
when the bike supply starts to switch from increasing to decreasing for the three pricing 
strategies are different. The switching time under NP or PP is later than that with FP. 
According to Figure 8, the number of bike arrivals under FP is less than that for NP and 
PP. Specifically, the number of bike arrivals under NP does not continuously decrease 




Figure 8 The number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation arrival at metro station 
over time 
Next, we want to further analyse the extra bike arrivals when negative pricing scheme 
is applied. As in Table 3, the demand from node B to node M is 0. The new bike arrivals 
must be from node R. Figure 9 shows the departure and arrival information at node R. 
One can notice that the bike departure from node R is still positive, while at the same 
time there are no available bikes under FP and PP at node R. The total bike departures 
are even higher than the initial supply of 50 bikes. As R has been set as an outflow node, 
the extra bikes at node R demonstrate that some travellers have changed their travel 
behaviour to park bike at node R under NP and the bike is later used by another traveller 
from node R to node M. All of these have clearly illustrated the effectiveness of the 
negative pricing in terms of a more balanced bike relocation. 
            
                      (a) Departure                                                      (b) Arrival 
Figure 9 The number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation at residential area 
It seems that FP scheme could be a good substitute of NP scheme as free charging is 
able to attract bike users and requires no additional cost from operators. The results 
from this numerical example can provide some direct comparisons between the two 
pricing strategies. Figure 9 can explain why the number of bike arrivals under FP at 
node M is smaller than that under NP. Under FP, the number of travellers using bike 
sharing is more than it under NP. Travellers who originally walk from node R to node 
B will change to use bike under FP. Under NP, as the node B is in the status of 
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oversupply, there is no monetary reward from node R to B. Those travellers will remain 
to walk from node R to node B. However, according to Table 3, there are positive travel 
demand from node M to node B. The supply at node M is sufficient at the very 
beginning. Thus, there is positive bike flow from node M to node B under FP. However, 
under NP there is no bike arrival at node B at certain time intervals (e.g., from 35 to 45 
and from 57 to 60). This is because traveller has changed his/her path to park the bike 
at node R, according to Figure 9 and Figure 10. In other words, under NP, traveller will 
cycle from M to R and change to other modes to arrive at B, due to triggered negative 
price from node M to node R. For travellers, although the total trip distance and total 
travel time increase, the monetary reward from NP can offset the increased disutility. 
For operators, travellers contribute to achieve a more balanced bike relocation, which 
can save the operation cost substantially.  
 
Figure 10 The number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation arrival at business area 
Figure 11 shows the bike flow evolution on each link over time. First, under PP, there 
are bike flows only on link M-B and link R-M, which is equal to the demand according 
to Table 3. The demand from node R to node B does not select to cycle because the 
short trip distance is more suitable for walking. As of the sufficient supply at node M, 
the bike flow on link M-B is stable. Since the supply at node R is not sufficient, when 
all bikes are used, the link flow R-B becomes to zero. Second, under FP, bike flow on 
link M-B does not change over time. It is also because of the sufficient supply at node 
M. The bike flow on link R-M is similar to the situation under PP, which first increases 
to peak value, then stabilizes for a while before it decreases in the end. The stable period 
at peak value in Figure 11(d) under FP is shorter than that under PP due to the bike flow 
on link R-B as shown in Figure 11(c). This is in line with the above conclusion obtained 
from Figures 9 and 10. It reflects that when the number of shared bikes is limited, FP 
could only speed up the bike usage rate but further enlarge the gap between supply and 
demand at the same time, which indeed cannot improve the service quality of the bike 
sharing system. Furthermore, FP attracts the short-distance travel demand, which is 
more suitable for walking. It is indeed a waste of resources and can even deteriorate the 
level of service.  Last, when NP implemented, bike flow on link M-B fluctuates over 
time as shown in Figure 11(a), which indicates the successful bike relocation and 
24 
 
repeated use of bikes within the peak hour. Basically, NP attracts and diverts some bike 
flow on link M-B to link M-R to support the bike supply at node R. Compared to FP, 
NP induces higher utilization rate for the shared bikes through a more balanced 
relocation achieved by the bike users. Also, NP does not increase the traffic flow in the 
network.  
  
(a) Link M-B                                                     (b) Link M-R   
 
 (c) Link R-B                                                   (d) Link R-M 
Figure 11 The bike flow changes on each link over time 
In addition, we conduct the sensitivity analysis of the threshold values and the results 
are illustrated in Figure 12(a) and (b). Firstly, we assume a fixed threshold value at 
origin node and seek to know how the threshold value at destination node affects the 
system performance in terms of total trip number and fare revenue.  From Figure 12, 
one can observe that, as threshold value at destination node increases, the NP condition 
tends to be fulfilled more easily. Thus, the total number of trips goes up  while the total 
fare revenue grows up first and then reduces due to the large amount of negative reward. 
If maximum fare revenue is to be achieved, the optimal threshold value at destination 
node could be easily obtained from the sensitivity analysis. In addition, we want to find 
how threshold value at trip origin node would affect the service operation performance. 
To do so, we assume fixed threshold value at destination node. It can be observed that, 
when threshold value at origin node increases, the NP condition becomes more difficult 




(a)                                                                       (b) 
Figure 12 The influence of threshold values on bike trips and fare revenue 
The previous analysis is based on the parameter setting that VOT equals to 10 dollars 
per hour  for all travellers. Figure 13 is depicted to show how the total amount of bike 
trips and fare revenue change after different VOT values. As VOT reduces, more 
travellers prefer to using bike. The increasing bike demands would result in more 
negative reward and thus renders the total fare revenue first increases before it goes 
down. In example 1, when all the travellers have the same VOT (VOT=10), the total 
bike trips are 230 units and the total fare revenue is 78.7 units.  When we consider 
different classes of travellers, as categorized by different VOT values (VOT=20, 10, 7), 
we can obtain the model results that the total amount of bike trips is 236 and the total 
fare revenue is 79.6. 
 
Figure 13 The influence of VOT on bike trips and fare revenue 
6.2 Numerical results for test example 2 
The second example is designed to illustrate the performance of NP in a more 
complicated network. A benchmark network Sioux Falls network is applied. The 
network parameter and population data are extracted from Chakirov and Fourie (2014).  
Three type of land use characteristics are classified: residential area, business area, and 
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metro station as shown in Figure 14. The traffic flow among OD is calculated based on 
Gravity model in Table 4. Assume the departure time are randomly distributed within 
the range of [1,60] minutes, T=75, , k=3. Three types of VOTs are considered 
with the value of 20, 10 and 7. Other parameters are same as above.  
 
Figure 14 Simplified Sioux Falls network (the numbers on link denotes the link 
distance) 
Table 4 OD demand of example 2 
O                            D Business Area Residential Area Metro Station 
Business Area 0 0 0 
Residential Area 2140 travellers 0 4291 travellers 
Metro Station 3541 travellers 0 0 
 
The computational experiments are run in MatlabR2017b on a notebook with an Intel 
Core i5-4210U, 1.7 GHz under Windows 10 Professional with 4 GB memory. When 
the program is complete, the running time for example 2 is 1943.07 seconds. Figure 15 





Figure 15 The convergence of the solution algorithm 
 
Figure 16 The number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation departure over time  
Figure 16 shows the number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation in the network 
over time. At the beginning, the number of bike trips are quite high under all three 
strategies. When time advances, the bikes run out in high demand area, and the number 
of bike trips quickly drop under PP and FP. Consequently, the bike trip accumulation 
become stable under PP and FP.  However, due to relocation feature of NP, bikes can 
be quickly re-supplied in undersupply area. The number of bike trips is always at a high 
level when NP is applied. The bike trip accumulation is even two times more than that 
under FP and PP. 
Figure 17 presents the number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation in each type of 
area. As shown in Figure 17(a), the number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation in 
residential area have the same trend with Figure 16. Specifically, under FP, the number 
of bike trips is extremely high in the beginning and reduces to 0 after certain time period. 
Under NP, there are more bikes relocated from residential area, as can be observed in 
Figure 17(b). NP obviously attracts more travellers to park bikes at undersupplied 
residential area. More specifically, there are 11 bikes arriving at residential area under 
PP. The number is 56 under FP, and 593 under NP. According to Figure 16, the total 
bike usage is about 1000 under PP or FP. The 593 bikes will be reused by travellers 
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from residential area to other places. The number of bike trips under NP has increased 
by about 50%. Figures 17(c) and (d) show the specific information at node 15 in 
residential area. 50 bikes run out quickly under FP or PP. However, about 230 bikes 
depart from node 15 under NP in the whole period, where 180 of them come from the 
relocation effect according to Figure 17(d).  
Figures 17(e) and (f) give the number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation in 
business area. Figures 17(g) and (h) present the detailed information at one specific 
node in business area. According to Table 4, the demand in business area is 0. The bike 
departure number under PP and FP are both zero. Under NP, there are about 600 bikes 
out of business area while the total bikes in the network are1200. It reflects that NP can 
achieve more than 50% bike relocation.  
  
            (a) Residential area departure                     (b) Residential area arrival 
 
         (c) Residential node 15 departure                  (d) Residential node 15 arrival 
 




            (g) Business node 8 departure                       (h) Business node 8 arrival 
Figure 17 The number of bike trips and bike trip accumulation over time 
To describe the bike flow status in entire network, the dynamic bike flow rates on each 
link are calculated. The number of bike flow are divided into six groups: 1-40, 41-80, 
81-120, 121-160, 161-200, and 201+. After classification, the results are shown in 
Figure 18. One can observe that FP easily leads to traffic congestion on bike links as it 
has the highest flow group (201+), as FP can quickly attract huge number of travellers 
to use bike. Although the total number of bike trips is similar with it under PP, the 
departure time of bike trips under FP is relatively concentrated. Under NP, though the 
total number of bike trips is greater than it under PP or FP, the trips are more evenly 
distributed in both time and space dimensions. Figure 19 shows the network 
performance under three pricing strategies. The average travel speed under FP is the 
slowest while the average travel speed under PP and NP are similar. The average travel 
distance under PP is the longest as the travellers who have paid the bike sharing service 
will fully utilise the bike to achieve door to door transport. Consequently, the number 
of average used links is maximum. Travellers might choose to cycle even if the trip 
distance is quite small under FP. Therefore, the average trip distance under FP is shorter 
than that under PP. Travellers will change their paths and modes under NP to relocate 
the bikes, which decreases the average trip distance. Indeed, the number of used links 
and the average trip distance are both the smallest for NP implementation.  
 




Figure 19 Network performance under three pricing strategies 
Next, we would like to investigate the performances of the three pricing strategies from 
operators’ perspective. Assuming there are 50 bikes at each node provided at the 
beginning, we plot the bike usage and fare revenue under different pricing strategies in 
Figure 20. Under FP, the total number of bike trips is only half of that under NP. Besides, 
the fare revenue is the least for FP, while the number of used bikes is maximum, which 
requires highest initial investment on bikes supply from operators.  In this example, NP 
has better performance than FP in any performance indicator. Compared to PP, NP also 
performs better in terms of total bike trips. However, the fare revenue under NP is less 
than that under PP. It should be noted that the total fare revenue is parameter sensitive.  
In the proposed dynamic pricing strategy, the threshold value of negative price is 
determined by the real time ratio of supply to demand, which is a time related function 
Eq. (22). In this example, the threshold value is set as a fixed value . If the 
parameter  increases, higher fare revenue can be achieved, up to the requirement 
of the operators.  
 
Figure 20   Bike usage and fare revenue under different pricing strategies 
Next, we seek to find out the optimal number of bikes and fare revenue in initial 
promotion stage when different pricing strategies are applied. Some other parameters 
are set as follows: user value is 1000 RMB, deposit fee is 200 RMB /user, bike cost is 
1500 RMB /bike (CEIBS, 2017). The relationship between the number of bikes and 




fare revenue is shown in Figure 21(a). In this example, the fare revenue from FP is 
always 0, which is the minimum among the three pricing schemes. The fare revenue 
from NP is less than PP in this example. The maximum objective function value under 
NP is indeed very close to that under FP. However, the required number of bikes is only 
1127 with the budget of 1.17 million, which is only one third of the budget under FP.  
 
(a)                                                                    (b) 
Figure 21 The relationship between the number of bikes and revenue and value 
7 Conclusions  
In this study, a new pricing strategy is proposed with negative price for dockless bike 
sharing service. Operator pay the users who cycle from the oversupplied area to 
undersupplied area. This pricing strategy could achieve bike relocation through 
stimulating travellers’ behaviour changes. Travellers’ choice behaviour is formulated 
by a user equilibrium dynamic traffic assignment model, in which traveller are allowed 
to use single or combined travel mode to complete the first/last mile trip by using walk, 
bike or bus. Two numerical examples are designed to test the influence of introducing 
the proposed pricing strategy as compared to the traditional PP and FP.  
The first example illustrates that FP and NP can both attract more users due to the low 
cost compared to PP. FP will increase the supply and demand gap when bike supply is 
insufficient. NP can guide the travellers to change their modes or paths to achieve a 
more balanced bike relocation. It also demonstrates that the proposed dynamic traffic 
assignment model can capture the dynamic supply-demand interactions in bike sharing 
system. The second example is conducted to illustrate the operation performance under 
different pricing strategies. With limited resources in initial promotion stage, NP 
performs better than FP and PP in various aspects, such as user attraction and fare 
revenue. While this is the first attempt to provide a theoretical justification of negative 
pricing scheme in a dockless bike sharing system, many assumptions have been made 
to ensure the problem to be more simplified and tractable, which at the same time bring 
limitations to the research outcomes. These assumptions are expected to be relaxed in 
the future studies to further analyse the optimal negative pricing scheme in the practical 
operation of dockless bike sharing system.  
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Proof. We first prove the necessity that the ideal dynamic user equilibrium superpath 
choice conditions Eqs. (21) - (23) imply variational inequality (43). For any path p, a 
feasible inflow at time t is 
  (A1) 
Multiplying ideal dynamic user equilibrium super path choice condition Eq. (21) by the (43), it 
leads to 
  (A2) 
Subtracting Eq. (22) from Eq. (A2), one can obtain 
  (A3) 
Summing up Eq. (A3) for all paths p and all OD pairs, it follows that 
  (A4) 
where the flow conversation equation 
  (A5) 
holds for each OD pair at each time interval t. Integrating Eq. (A5) from 0 to T, we can obtain 
variational inequality (43). 
Next, we prove the sufficiency that any solution  to (43) satisfies ideal dynamic user 
equilibrium super path choice conditions Eqs. (21)-(23). We know that the first and third ideal 
dynamic user equilibrium super path choice conditions Eqs. (21)-(23) hold by definition. Thus, 
we need to prove that the second ideal dynamic user equilibrium super path choice condition 
Eq. (22) also holds. 
Assume that the second ideal dynamic user equilibrium super path choice condition Eq. 
(22) does not hold only for a path  for OD pair during time interval 
  
  (A6) 
Since the Eq. (22) holds for all paths other than path  for OD pair  at any time 
interval t and for OD pair  at any time interval , it follows that 
  (A7) 
Note that all other terms in the above equation vanish because of Eq. (22). For each OD 
pair w, we can always find one minimal actual travel time path   for travellers 
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departing origin at time t, where path  was evaluated under the optimal inflow pattern 
. For this path , Eq. (21) becomes an equality by definition. It follows that 
  (A8) 
Next, we need to find a set of feasible path inflows satisfying: 
  (A9) 
We consider all the departure flows for all OD pairs at each time interval t. For 
each OD pair w at each time t, we assign OD departure flow to the minimal 
travel time path  , which was evaluated under the optimal flow pattern . 
This generates a set of feasible path inflow patterns  in which Eq. (A9) is 
always satisfied because flows are not assigned to paths with non-minimal travel times 
evaluated under the optimal path inflow pattern . Summing equations (A9) 
for all paths p and all OD pairs w, it follows that 
  (A10) 
Integrating the above equation for time period [0, T], we have 
  (A11) 
We subtract Eq. (A6) from Eq. (A11) and obtain 
  (A12) 
where the flow conversation equation 
  (A13) 
holds for each OD pair w at each time interval t so that the second term vanishes. The 
above equation contradicts variational inequality problem (43). Therefore, any optimal 
solution  to variational inequality (43) satisfies Eq. (22). Since we proved the 
necessity and sufficiency of the equivalence of variational inequality Eq.(43) to Eqs. 
(21)-(23), the proof is complete. 
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